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ABSTRACT
The average effect of social programs on outcomes such as
earnings is a parameter of primary interest in econometric
evaluations studies. New results on using exclusion restrictions
to identify and estimate average treatment effects are presented.
Identification is achieved given a minimum of parametric
assumptions initially without reference to a latent index
framework. Most econometric analyses of evaluation models motivate
identifying assumptions using models of individual behavior. Our
technical conditions do not fit easily into a conventional discrete
choice framework, rather they fit into a framework where the source
of identifyimg infonnation is institutional knowledge regarding
program administration. This framework also suggests an attractive
experimental design for research using human subjects, in which
eligible participants need not be denied treatment. We present a
simple instrumental variables estimator for the average effect of
treatment on program participants, and show that the estimator
attains Chamberlain's semi-parametric efficiency bound. The bias
of estimators that satisfy only exclusion restrictions is also
considered.
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NBER and Harvard University1. INTRODUCTION. Do programs that subsidize education and training improve the labor
market outcomes of program participants? Evaluation questions of this type arc of great
concern to government policy makers, private employers, and academic researchers. 1st any
field where scientific research has pohcy implications, evaluation methudology is also of con-
siderable importance. Discussions of evaluation methodology are discussions of the nature
and credibility of scientific evidence. In medical research, for example, government regula-
tions establish standards and procedures that researchers must follow for their results to be
considered credible evidence for the efficacy and safety of new drugs. Standards here are
quite clear: research guidelines for a new drug application clearly favor, but do not require,
the randomized assigment of treatment and concurrent data collection on control groups
(Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 1988, pp. 22, 56)
Social policy is arguably as important for hnmanwelfares.s public health, yet no mutually
agreed standard of evidence exists for establishing the effectiveness of social programs. On
the one hand, critical research on econometric evaluation methodology by Laloode (1986)
and others has led to renewed interest in classical experimentation as a tool for social policy
evaluations. Masiski and Carfinkel (1991) note that the recent Job Partnership Training Act
(JPTA) even mandates a particular sort of treatment—control evaluation design in which
applicants (or training are randomly denied treatment. On the other hand, Manski and
Garfinkel (1991) and Heckman and Hotz (1989) argue persuasively that experiments
never be a complete substitute for evaluations using observational data. Disagreements overevaluation methodology notwithstanding, research directed towards adapting experiniental
designs for social policy analysis and allowing for fewer assumptions in observational anal-
yses is likely to remain important. Tins paper contributes to both the experimental and
observational components of the evaluation research agenda by prcscnling new results nit
using exclusion restrictions to identify and estimate average treatment effects.
Our findings are related to results in a number of recent papers on theoretical identifi-
cation in evalnation models. Like Chamberlain (1986), Beckman (1990a) and Heckiuao and
Houord (1990), we are couceroed with identification given a minimum number of paramet-
rir assumptions. But, as in Manski (1990),weavoid the additive latent index framework
commonly invoked in econometric evaluations. Much of the previous work nit identifica-
tion presents some very general findings regarding the ideitification of distributions, but
devotes relatively little attention to couvertiog theoretical identification into empirically fea-
sible estimators. In contrast, the formulation in this paper focuses on conditional means,
and is immediately useful to applied researchers because it provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for linear instrumental variables techniques to consistently estimatc [lie a.veragc
effect of treatment, In this, our approach is related to Angrist's (1991) use of instrumental
variables to estimate treatment effects in nonlinear models, although here the identification
conditions are not motivated by functional form restrictions.
We also show how to interpret the identifying assumptions as outlining a particular type
of experimental design useful for research involving li,irnan subjects. Like Tlcckman (19911b),
2• we view social experiments as a source of identifying information, rather than as a replace-
merit for economic modelling, and think that experiments should be designcd with this in
mini An experimental design interpretation of instrumental Variables identification condi-
tions is important because the resulting design may be ethically more attractive titan the
conventional approach to randomization wherein eligible program applicants are randomly
excluded from treatment. For example, some physicians have argued that randomization
is incompatible with the Personal Care Principle in medical ethics, which requires doctors
to put the welfare of their patients ahove the potential social gains from research (Royall
[1991]). JPTA program administrators are also reluctant to deny training to applicants
randomized into a control group (Hotz [1991]).
Our framework for experimental design essentially consists of first choosing an eligible
population or evaluation site, either by randomized manipulation, or on the basis of ignorahie
(as defined by Rosenhaum and Robin [1983]) covariates. Any eligible participant is then
allowed to participate in the program if he or site likes- This approach may also identify
• parameters which are more likely to be useful for forecasting the impact of future programs-5
As a related by-product, our approach to inference also provides some insight regarding
the problem of non—compliance in clinical trials, recently analyzed by Efron end Feldman
(1991) and Robins (1989). Randomization of intention--to—treat, but not actual treatment,
5Harris (1985) and Moult (199Th) also discuss randomization of ales verses esodoniisatioo of isdividu-
ak However,akey distinctioe is that within sites these aothors argue for saturation of treatment withis
sites whilewe donet. Different average treatmrnt effects see therefore idei,tilled is thetwotypes of site-
randomization designs.
3is one way to generate excLusion restrictions that will be sufficient to identify an average
treatment effect. Not surprisingly, the estimator that uses these exclusion restrictionsis a
form of instrumental variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the average effect of treat-
ment on prugram participants and presents the main theoretical results. Necessary and
sufficient conditions are given for a data generating prucess to identify an average treatment
effect under exclusion restrictioos. These results are also compared to previous results on
the identification of treatment effects. Section 3 outlines the instrument-al variables inter-
pretation of identifying information and discusses the type of experimental design or data
generating processes tisat satisfy the identifying conditions. Some results on the efficient
use of exclesiun restrictions in estimating average treatment effects are also discussed. In
section 4 we discuss what can he learned about treatment effects if the average treatment
effect of interest is not identified. It is shown that one might still he able to derive hounds
for the average treatment effect. Section 5 offers a summary and some cencluding thouglsts
on the nature of identifying information in models for the evaluation of social programs.
An important distinction, and an underlying theme of the paper, is tlse difference betwn
identifying information derived from models of prograsn participants' beliavinc and from in-
formation about program eligibility rules. We argue thai. the latter is more lilse!y to provide
a convincing empirical identification strategy.
2.1 IDENTIFJCATON. Our framework is essentially similar to that advanced by Ruhin (1977),
4 -}Jeckman (1990), and others. Let }'0 be the response variable for an individual if lie or she
doesnotparticipate in the program. We assume that Y5iswell defined even if the individual
is actually participating in the program. Similarly, Y5 is the value of the response variable
if the individual does participate in the program, and 1's —1'sis the treatment effect that
we are interested in. We never ohserve both Y5andYi; all inferences about these differences
are indirect and in terms of expectations. Let fs(y) and fs(p) denote the probability density
functions of Y0 and 1' respectively. P denotes an indicator for program participation, equal
to one if an individual participates in the program, and equal to zero otlserwise.
The average treatment effect can be defined in a number of ways (See, e.g., Heckman
and Rnhb [19851, and Heckman [19901). First, there is the cxpcctation of Y —Y0in the
population:
(1)&=EI1i—Ys)fy[fs(y)_fo(y)]d
This is the expected treatment effect if we take an individual randomly from the population
andlook at the difference between his response as a participant and nonparticipant. .& second
averagetreatment effect is defined by taking the expectation conditional on participation:
(2) a= E[Y1—l'sIP = 11=f[fi(1P1)— fs(yIP= 1)]dp
This srieasures how much a participant gains from the program. Whether the focus is on the
average treatment effect (ATE), Es, or on the selected averagc treatment effect (SATE), ce
depends on the particular application. We are.nsually interested in forecasting the effectsof a program when it is extended tu a larger part of society. If the program or treatment
will potentially be used by all members of the population, & is appropriate. If the program
will eventually be used by a population with characteristics similar to (lie population in the
evaluation design, a is the relevant average treatment effect. The latter is probably more
realistic in economic applications. We will therefore concentrate on iden ti licatiun of cs, rather
than &,
The problem of estimating average treatment effects in our framework is one of sample
selection exactly the same as that considered by Gronau (1974), Heckman (1979) and Manski
(1990) We observe Y P -Y1+ (1 —P)-Pband P. From this two conditional response
distributions are ideotified
Ji(yIP=1) and fe(vIP=0),
along with the probability of participation, q =Pr(P=1).These distributions do not allow
us to calculate & or a, for which we need to know the cousiterfactnal expectation EI}'IP= 1],
The difference between the meen of Y1 for those who participate and Pb for those who do
not participate can be written as
EfY P=I]—E[YeIP=0
=E[Y1PbPl} + E[Ye]P =1]—E[Y5P =U]=o+ /3
The average difference in outcomes between program participants saul nonpartir.ipants gee-
crahly confoonds the treatment effect a and the selection effect /3.Theexceptino is when
6•
fiIP 1) is equal to f(y4P =0)for i =0,1and all y, in which case selection is sometimes
said to be ignorable. This implies that the two response distributions (with and without
participation) do not depend on the decision to participate. If this is not the case then
selection is non—ignorable and it is clear that we need more information, or restrictions on
fo(), to separate a and ft. Below, we briefly review some identifying assumptions.
The first approach assumes that the selection problem can be solved simply by condi-
tioning on the right covariates.
Condition 1 There is en observable couariatc X such that
E[Y P =1,X=xl =E[Y1IP0, xJ
In this case we can condition on)( to remove the selection effect if we observe (1', F, X):
a=JE(Y1IP
=1,X=x]—E[1IP= I,X x]g(xIP 1)dx
=JEr}cIP=1x=x]_E[vslP=o,x=].g(xIPudx
• This is in terms of expectations and distributions that can usually be estimated. The selec-
tion effect is equal to;
ft= J E(Y5IP=1,X = s] g(wli']). E]Y5]P=0,X=s]y(x]P rO)]dx
=JE[Y]P= OX=x]- [g(rIP =l)—g(xIP 0)]dr
7which can also be estimated. Ifg(zP1) =g(xP = 0)for all x, implying that Pr(E =ljx)
does not depend on x, selection is ignorable alter all and the selection effect is zero.
Conditioning on covariates corresponds to identification by adequately controlling for all
factors related to both outcomes and treatment. References for this approach include Rubin
(1977) and, in a regression framework, Barnow, Cain, and Coldherger (1981). A generalized
control function methodology is outlined by Heckman and }t.obb (1985). An alternative
approach to evaluation restricts the manner in which treatment is assigned. For example,
treatment may be randomly assigned. In an experimental context, the distinction between
approaches to causal inference based on control and randomization dates back at least to
Fisher (1935). The econometric approach to restricting the manner of treatment assignment
is to impose an exclusion restriction
Condition 2 There is a random variable Z such thaifurall z
EVsIZ =zJ=E[Y5]
and
E[PZ =z]is e non trivial function of z
Tbecovariate Z aFfects the participation probability, hut is nct related to tbe expected
response in the ahseeee of treatment.
Exclusion restrictions are widely used in econometrics, usually in conjunction with other
identifying restriction. One of tise most influential approaches is that developed in a series





Theconditional expectation of }, given Z =z is
EIY5IZ= z]=p+E(cIZ=zj=p
and since participation depends on both Z and U, it satisfies Condition 2. Notice that the
treatment effect a in (3) is identical for every subject, so it is equal to the average and
selected average treatment effects.
Another example is Angrist's (1991) nonlinear model with an omitted variable, U, that
is correlated with F, but independent of an excluded instrument Z:
E(YrF =pU =u,Z =z] = F(p,u; fi)
E[FIU=u,Z =z) = G(u,z;
andZ and U independenL Angrist shows that the average treatment effect
a= E[P(i,U/3)— P(O,U;$)]
9is identified U and only if F or G is additively separable. In most of the sconometric
literature identification is based on distributional assumptions, functional form assumptions
regarding either the conditional expectation of the response function and the probability
of participation, or both. In our main result, we investigate when the exclusion restriction
outlined in condition 2 is sufficient to identify the average treatment effect. Our approach is
to invoke easily verifiable restrictions on the value of L(.r, u) and the distribution of Z.
Condition 3 There is a set Ze such that 1 >Fr(ZE Z5) >0,Pr(P =12=4 = 0for
all z E Zo.
Theorem I Condiiions 2 and S are sufficieat for identification of a with a random semple
of(Y,Z,P).
Proof; Let A be an indicator for the event Z Z'. Then:
E[YIA =0=E[]
E[YIA =1]=g[Y514=I]+ Pr[P =hA=1].E[Y1 —Y5A=l,P=i]
=E[Y]+Pr(P=IIA= 1}E[Y1-}P=h]
Since we can consistently estimate Pr[P =hA=iJ, E[YIA=0]and E[YIAflwecan
identify a =E]Y1-.Y°IF1]{E[Y1A1] —E]Y]A=0]}/Pr(P=1IA= 1).
QED.
10The theorem above shows that it is sufficient for identification to haveavalue1 or set
of values, 4,whichis realised with non-zero probability and for which the prohability of
participation is zero. The question arises whether this is a necessary as well as a sufficient
condition A complete answer is difficult to give. But, a number of related results suggest
that it is almost impossible to achieve identification otherwise. First we note that the key
to identifying a is the identification of E[Ys]:
Result 1 a is identified if end only qE[Y0]is sdentifled.
Proof: By definition a =E[Y1IP11—E[Y0)P=I].Note that EIIP I] is identified
because we observe 1' if P =1.Therefore identification of a is equivalent to identification of
E[Y5IP =I].This is equal to {E[] —(1 —Pr(P=1))-E[Y5IP=O]}/Pr(P=1).Because
E[Y0IP =0]and Pr(P =3)are identified, identification of EJY0IP =1]is equivalent to
identification of E[Ys].
QED.
Second, we show that if Z is a discrete random variable, Condition 3 is indeed necessary
for identification of E[Y5] and therefore for identification of a:
Result 2 Suppose Z is a discrete reudom variable with K posrsls of ssspport. if Pr(P =
= zs)>0for eli k, then E[Y5] is not identified without edditional restrictions.
Proof: We can identify from the sampling design, for k =1,,.,K,
E(YIZ= ] = E[Ys]+ Pr(P =lZ=) . E[Y—)5f2=4]
11There are K equations in K + I unknowns. Therefore we cannot identify E[Y] without some
restriction on —YsZ=zkjif Jr(P 14Zz5}> 0 for all 4. Note that one restriction
such aS equality of the conditional difference E[Yi —Y5Z=at)for k and k is sufficient for
identification of E[Y5].
QtD.
The reasos that Results 1 and 2 do not constitute a complete argument for sufficiency
is that if Zis not discrete, it might be possible to identify E[Y0) in certain limiting cases,
even when Condition 3 fails. In fact, this sort of "identification at infisuty" is an underlying
theme of a number of previous results on the identification of treatment effects.
2.2 COMPARISONWITHPREVIOUS IDENTIFICATION RESULTS. Conditions 2 and 3 and
Theorem 1 are related to seIne recent results on semi-parametric identification. In latent
index models like (3)—(5), if the disturbances are normal then there is clearly no set Zo
such that the participatioo probability is zero for that set. This implios that we cannot
estimate EfY5I =E[YIA0], the expected response for those who had zero probability
of participating, sn that identification cannot he based on Theorem 1. However, one might.
be able to estimate E[1' in the limit. One such approach is Condition B in lleckman's
(1900) theorem on nnsparametric identification of treatment effects in a latent-index sample
selection niode.l. Jieckrnan requires the support of7 Z in the latent index to be the real line.
Therefore, there is a sequence of sets 2 such that the probability of participating gues to
zero in the limit. That is, there is a sequcnce of sets Z, such that fur all sequences of real
12numbers p,, >0and 5, >0converging to zero, Pr(Z E Z,) >5,,,and Pr(P =l3=z)<Tb.
forall z E Z,,. If the limit lim,.., E[Y5IP =0,2 E Zn]E[Y5]for all such sequences ij,,
and5,,, then an estimate based on such a sequence can take the place of ELYeA =0]in
the proof of Theorem I and identification is still obtained. This is similar to an earlier
result in Chamberlain (1986) regarding semi—parametric identification of censored regression
models. But both Chamberlain (p. 205) and fleckman (p. 317) seem to feel that this sort
of "identification at infinity" is not a very compelling foundation for inference, Chamberlain
explores the possibility of imposing additional mild restrictions that would actually rule out
this result.
Identification at infinity is unnatural in latent index models partly hecause many, if not
most, regressors in economics have bounded support and are discrete. Most importantly,
however, the latent index framework is usually motivated from a model of individual choice.
Although the economic theory of discrete choice is well—developed and generally accepted,
the details of empirical implementation are not. Identification at infinity requires not only
covariates shifting choices hut exchsded from outcomes, hut also a covariate—choice relation.
ship that oheys additional restrictions without intrinsic behavioral or iustitutional content.
Both our Theorem 1 and previous results rely on exclusion restrictions and restrictions on
the probability of participating for certain grout's. Therefore, identification under Theorem
I is similar to identification under the results of Chamberlain (1986) and }leckman (1990).
One essential feature, however, distinguishes our s.pproach from the traditional econometric
13viewpoint; In Theorem 1, the main source of identifying information —theset of covariates
for whom the probability of participation is scro is obtained from the knowledge that the
program was simply not offered to certain individuals or groups. A latent index framework
in this esso is unnnatoral and unnecessary; with this sort of prior information there is no
need to rely on limiting behavior.6
Secondly, we note that Manski (1990) presents sisnilar results regarding identification of
density functions in selection models without refereoce to a latent index framework, Manski's
Corollary 2 (p. 30) shows that given certain level—set restrictions, nonparametric bounds on
density functions coincide, and therefore the density function is identified, if and only if the
probability of selection is one for some part of the population. Like Beckman and Cham-
berlain, however Manski (p. 30) seems to feel that ideotifying with level—set restrictions is
"rarely identifying in practice." Part of the reason for this is that while the results by Man-
ski and Beckman give identification in principle, Chamherlain proves that the information
bound can be zero for these models. Our approach requires that Pr(Z 6 2)>0, which
unplies that the treatment effect is estimable at rate 1W.
Finally,Imbens and Angrist (1991) discuss identification of local average treatment ef-
fects. The local average treatment effect, is the expected Ireatment effect for individisals
who would change their participation status if their value of 3 were changed fron] z to me.
Identification of the local average treatment effect does not requiro the existence of a group
6The argumestwemake fur identifying information fron program eligibility rules is sicnilar to tbat made
inlormally inarecent paper by MolfiL (1991).
14with zero participation probability. However, the exclusion restriction must be strengthened
antirequires that both Yand }'areindependent of Z.Inaddition the relation between the
instrument and participation is restricte& The result in Theorem I shows that the existence
of an ineligible group directly reduces the need for untestable conditions for identification of
a meaningful average treatment effect.
Recent empirical examples of evaluations in this framework include the geographically
randomized Educational Assistance Test Program (EAT?) and Multiple Option Recruiting
Experiment (MORE), in which different packages of veterans educational benefits were ran-
dornized over military recruitment stations (Fernandez [1982]). In the EATP and MORE,
new benefit packages were not offered to a random subsample of stations. Examples of ob-
servational research where the source of identifying information is derived from institutions
include Angrist's (1990) use of the draft lottery to estimate the labor market consequences
of Vietnam—era military service, Angrist and Krueger's (1989) use of birthday—ordering to
estimate the effects of World War II military service, and Angrist and Krueger's (1991) use of
the interaction hetwen compulsory school attendauce laws and quarter of hirth to estimate
the effects of compulsory schooling on earnings.
As in most econometric applications, the examples listed above were implemented using
statjstical models with a constant treatment effect, so that the exclusion restrictions alone
are sufficient for identification. But selected average treatment effects may also be identified
in some o these cases. For example, in the compulsory schooling application, virtually all
15stndents born in certain quarters were compelled to complete an additional year of schooling.
Other students chosewhetheror not to continue in school; the treatment in this case is failure
to complete art additional year of schooling. Likewise, in the Vietnam—era draft lottery,
virtually all non—deferred meo with low lottery numbers were drafted.7
2.3 IDENTIFiCATION OF THE AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT.
If instead of the set 4wehad a set 4suchthat Pr(P = liZ =z)=Ifor all z 4,
wewould he able to identify the selected average non—treatment effect:
—a= E[Y0—Y1P= 0]
The selected average non—treatment effçct measures how much non—participants gain (or
lose) from not participating in the program. This identification result is obvious if we reverse
what we call treatment and non—treatment. If there is both a set Ze that satisfies Condition
3 and a set 4thatsatisfies the above condition we can identily the average treatment effect
& The three treatment effects arc related by the following identity:
& =PrJP=1]a + (1 —PrIP= 1]) .a
Irstuition for why a is identified is apparent from the proof of Theorem I: E[I] is identified
iiithesample where Z Z5, and E[Y5] is identified in the set where Z Z. If the treatment
effect is identical for everybody then a =ri=&. Ingeneral however, the treatment effects
for participants and non—participants can be different, and in that case idenl.ification of the
7For the identificalion results of this psper to hold in thelotLerysxample, defermentwouldhave te be
an igrrerable ceesriate.
16average treatment effect (ATE) requires stronger assumptions than does identification of the
selected treatment effect (SATE).
3.]EUGIBIL1TY-R4NDOM1ZATION AS AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN. Social experiments
cciibe based on the random assignment of eligibility allowing individuals to freely choose
whether or not to participate. This is art alternative to experiments where randomization
takes place at the later stage where individuals have already expressed a willingness to
participate.6 Let D be an indicator, equal to I if someone is willing to participate and zero
otherwise. Suppose there is some characteristic, indicated by a binary variable, A, where only
people with A =1are eligible for treatment. In addition, assume that the joint distribution




(6) f(Y1,DIA =1)=f(Z,DIA=0)for i =0,1
The condition that is required for identification of EYJ —YP=1]using Theorem1 is
thaL E[1IA =1)=ELY5IA=0].Equation (6) is much stronger than this, but it snakes the
identification strategy and the difference between the two types of experiments transparent.
5An example of this type ef design is the Netionsi S,pportedWoskDe,nosstratiou, analysed by Lalonde
(11185).
17A direct consequence of (6) is that E[Y5IA =a)=E[Ys]and therefore A satisfies both
conditions 2 and 3 and we es-n identify the selected average treatment effect
=E)Y-1'P =11= E[} hID =i]=EIY4=1]-YV=0],
The SATE is io this ease the expected treatment effect for all participants if eligibility were
to be extended to the entire population, ic. if A =1for all individuals,9 The combination
of the ineligibles and eligible non—participants allows us to identify the distribution of efor




where Pr(D =1)=Pr(D=l]A=1)is identified from the proportion of participants
among eligibles. One advantage of this type of experimentrather than the randomizing of
applicants is that we also observe a mnnher of individuals who do psot wish to participate
and therefore we can identify the selection effect fi.
Harris (1985), Garfinkel, Macski and Michalopuulos (1991) and Moflit (1991) refer to
experiments based on site randomization as macroexperiments, in contrast to microexper-
iments in which individuals within a site are randomly assigned to treatment andcontrol
groups. These authors stress that such macrnexperiments can potentiallyidentity macro
lrertment effects that result from interaction between individuals, An important difference
5lJer resultdiffersfrom that in fleckmaii (1091b,p.27) becausewecompare eligibles and ineligibles
whereas Heckman compares participants and irsel,giblra.
18between our approach and previous discussion of macro experiments, however, is that we are
not arguing for saturation of treatment within eligible sites.'°
A fnrther advantage of an experiment in which eligibility is randomly assigned is tbat
there is no formal application process for subjects who will later be randomized out. The
need to deny treatment appears to he major factor in the dissatisfaction of job training
centers with randomized assigment (Manslci end Garfinkel 1991). Morcoever, iii medical
research, eligibility randomization does not require that individual physicians deny a treat-
nsent they feel is beneficial (as ocurred in the controversial EGMO textracorporeal membrane
oxygenation] study of infant mortality; see Royall, [1991]). Instead of randomizing treatment
within hospitals, randomly chosen hospitals could have been selected for study, with physi-
cians freely choosing the most appropriate treatment within eligible sites, and data collected
on outcomes at all sites. Another issue of interest in medical research is the question of
non—compliance in conventional clinical trials. It is clear that as long as eligibility for treat-
ment ("intention—to—treat" in biometric terminology) is randomized, the effect of a binary
treatment on participants is identified using Theorem I.
3.2 LINEAR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION. In this section we show that if
conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied we can estimate a in a straightforward manner. First we
discuss the case where we observe Y, P and A, an indicator for the event Z 20. Tn this
'0Thc Wisconsin Child Support Demonstration (Garfinkel 1983) follows lIds hssic spprosclL. Treatments
in thisstudysrs randomized over Wisconsin counties, sltliough the Focus is on county-level outcomes asd
sot the individual outcomes csptueed bySATEas defined here.
19case we can estimate a by linear instrumental variables. Second we analyzethe case where
we observe Y, P and Z, It turns out that this does not necessarilyincrease the efficiency of
our estimate of the treatment effect. Finally we dliscuss estimationif we do not observe A
itself, but a variable correlated with A.
The first estimator is a linear instrumental variables estimator. The variable A is an
instrument for the endogennus regressor P because
(7)EIYIA] =E[Y5)+ E[PIAI E[Y1— Y5IP1]
The sample analog of the solution for a is an estimate of Cov(y, A)/Cov(P, A):
-
PA1
where ?4s and PAn are sample averages conditional on A =1.
The question naturally arises whether we can improve on this estimate of the selected
average treatment effect if we observeS as well as A. UsingChamberlain's (1990) approach
to semi—parametric efficiency bounds one can show that this is only possible ifZ affects the
conditional variance of Ye:
Theorem 2 If the conditional variance of Y0, E[(Ys —EY5D2IZ=z]does not depend oa
z, then&is, within the the class of regular estimators thet only use the restrictions implied
by Conditions 2 and 5, en efficient estimator for a if the conditional veriancedoe.s dcpend
en z,onecan obtain a more efficient estimator by replacing ?As in the forrneia for& by
on efficient estimator for E[Y0] that edopts for the heteroseedesticity.
20Proof: see appendix.
r Given A, there is only useful information in Z if Y5 is conditionally heteroskedastic. However,
it is unusual to have a case where one line a convincing argument that Z does not belong in the
conditional mean function, but does belong in the conditional variance function Therefore,
in most eases the instrumental variables estimator based on A will he efficient.
Finally, note that if conditions 2 and 3 are satisfied but we do not observe A, we can still
consistently estimate a if we observe a random variable X satisfying
Condition 4 E[YIA,X] =E[YIA] E[PIA,X] =E[PjA]
and E[PIX z] is a nontrivial function of x,
Condition 4 implies that X affects mean outcomes and treatment probabilities only through.
its effect on eligibility 4 In this ease we can use X as an instrument instead of A. To see
this, note that from (7);
E{E[YIA)IX} =.E[Ye]+ IffYi —YeP=1]-E{EfPIA]IX}
whichsimplifies to
E[YIX] =E[Y5]+ E[Yi —Yelp=1]-.E[PlXj
Thisimplies that X is a valid instrument. It is clear that using both X and A as instrunsents
is equivalent to using just A because A' does oot add any information once A is known.
However, X may be useful if A is not observed. En the example of the dralt lottery, one
might envision knowing the week a person was born, but not the exae day. In that ease the
21week is the inaccurate instrument X while the actual day on which a person is born would
be the accurate instrument A.
4. INFERENCE WHEN THE SELECTED AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT IS NOT IDENTIFIED.
In this section we discuss what can be learned about treatment effects when Condition 2
is satislied, but not Condition 3. There is no control group of ineligibles, and therefore
an essential component of the instrumental variables approach discussed in the previous
section is missing. We also assume that 2 is discrete with points of support z5, z,. .. , z.
Let PxkPr(P=lZ = a,,), at, = E[Y1—Y5IP=l,Z=as),11'= Pr(Z=a,,)and
Q =Pr(P=I)=E1r,,p,.In terms of these parameters, the selected average treatment
effect is equal to
'at
The probability limit of the instrumental variables estimator of the parameter ctx in the
equation
=EY0}+ ax' F + {[(Y, —Y5)—rs)j'P + a
where a = — E[Ys]and the term in curly brackets is a compound error term. The
instrument vector is [1 E[PjZ]). This is the optimal instrument when the compound error





TheA5 are weights that have expectation equal to one, but they can he negative. Note that
E[YIZ =as]= E[Y0] -Zk Pa,
Then we have:
Result 3 The instrumental variables estimator far a using Z as an instrument for P has
probability limit
a5 =E[A5 aa,]=A - ae+ (1— A)'a
where
as =
ProofThe first part follows directly from the expression for Eft'IZ = 2]andthe defini-
tions for aa, and A5. To see the second part, write:
1
[as —Aas]
1.1E[plk(pa,—Q)aa,] li1Pzk] E1p] —
1—A1E[p(pa, —Q)] E[pa,(p5 —Q)IE]p]°
which simplifies to ElpIkaXk/Q] which is equal to a. QETh
5e is a weighted average treatment effect, with weights proportional tolithe treat-
ment effect is constant, then both ae and aA coincide with the eclccted average treatment
23effect a. Therefore if we are prepared to bound the treatment effect heterogeneity1t, we
can calculate bounds for the selected average treatment effect as follows: Note that A in the
above result is estimable from the data'2 Define c = as/a. In terms of c and A the bias of
the IV estimator is;
—
A.c-l-(l—A)
Giveisa choice rife, the bound is eetimable.
An alternative to bounding the treatment effect heterogeneity is the approach in Im-
hens and Angrist (1991) whore restrictions on the way in which the instrument Zaffects
participation is employed to ideotify a local average treatment effect.
5.Coiccaustorc.The SATE measures tbe average difference between the outcomes of
program participants and what participants' outcomes would have been had they not been
treated. When some individuals or groupe are ineligible to participate in a program, and
eligibility does not affect outcomes for other reasons, the SATE is identified using a simple
instrumental variables estimator. This estimator wiil usually be efficiont —itmakes full use
of the identifying information provided by program eligibility rules.
The possibility of ideotification through eligibility rules is established using the same
logic asrecentarguments for identification based on the existence of s set of covariates for
which the probability of treatment approaches zero in the limit. The source of identifying
''This is analternativeIn beunds on theresponse variable itself, whirl, is analyzed asin the context of
selecuou models inManshi(19911,)
Is Angriet and Krueger (1990) A is estimated to be about 25 for tin relation betweenquarl.er ofbirth
asd highschool graduation.
24information is different, however, and likely to he more credible than identification through
latent index models of individual behavior. Program rules are a matter of public record,
and observed data can be used to verify enforcement of the rules. identification through
eligibility rules may also provide a good forecast of future program effects under the same
roles. Another attractive feature of tins approach is that no eligible participant need be
denied treatment in experimental designs based on this principle.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2; The selected average treatment effect a is equal to (E[YIA =
1]—E[YIA=O])/(Pr(P=11,4 = 1).An efficient estimator can therefore be obtained by
substituting efficient estimators for E[YIA =1],E[YIA =0]and Pr(P =hA=1)in this
formula. We will show that
1) ?A=s is an efficient estimator for E[Y1.4 =1],
2) PA.1isan efficient estimator for Pr(F =hA=1),
3) =s is an efficient estimator for E[Y!A =0]if the conditional varis.ncc of ) given 3
does not depend on 3.
There are two steps. First we show that the model can be characterized by a finite onniher
of conditional moment restrictions. Second we show that given those monsent restrictions
the three estimators are efficient.
The model implies the following conditional monsent restrictions: If A =(Ithen
E[Y—OIZ]=0 E[PIZ]=0
25If A 1 then
E[P —h1(Z)IZ]=0E[Y —h7(Z)IZ]=0
The model does not imply any other restrictions, it is essential to show tlsis before proving
efficiency using the Chamberlain bounds The argument goes as follows. Suppose we have a
ds.tagenerating process for (Y, Z, P) with P binary satisfying the moment conditions. Then
we can always construct a model that satisfies (i) and (2) as follows:
E[Y5IZJ=O
Choose any non—constant function for E(YeIZ, P =0],let
E[Y5Z, P =1]={LJ.-(1
—Jsj(Z))E[Ys!Z,P 0]}/h1(Z)
and then we complete the model by choosing for all Z
E[Y1]Z, P =I]={lss(Z)—0 + h1(Z) .E[Y013,P =i]}/h5(Z)
This constructed model satisfies E[Y5j2] =llfor all Z. For this construction it is essential
to have lss(Z) >0which is true when .4 =1by definition.
Given that the model is fully characterized by the conditional moments, it is straight-
forward to derive the bounds for the three quantities of interest: E[&1(Z)], E[1s2(Z)] and
0. The formulas in Chamberlain (1990, p 7) can he applied and simplified directly. First 0.
Given a set of N5 observations with A =0,the bound on the variance of JWn(O— 0')is
{E[fl[( _0.)213]]}
26Tins simplifies to —O)]if there is no heteroskedasticity The variance of vN5(e—
0)is E[(Y5 —O')j.Therefore YA=o is efficient if there is no heteroskedasticity. Jo exactly
the same way we look at the variance bound for E[h1(Z)] arid Eh2(Z)givena set of N1
observations with A =1.in both eases the variance is eqoal to the variance of the average.
In other words ?= and PA=1 are efficient estimators.
QED.
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